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ABSTRACT
The connections between globalization and democracy are a classic question in international political
economy and a topic much debated in foreign policy circles.  While the analytical literature is
extensive, few previous studies have acknowledged the possibility of bidirectional causality or
developed an instrumental variables strategy suitable for addressing it.  We do so in this paper and
apply our approach to an extensive historical data set.  The results suggest the existence of positive
relationships running both ways between globalization and democracy, though exceptions obtain at
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1.  Introduction 
  Democracy and globalization go hand in hand.  So say those impressed by the 
opening to the world economy of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe following 
the demise of Soviet-led authoritarianism.  And so say those impressed by the outward 
orientation of Latin America since the wave of democratization that began in 1978.
2 
Insofar as free international transactions benefit society as a whole, democracy that 
renders leaders more accountable to the citizenry should be conducive to the removal of 
restrictions on such transactions.
3  The democracy-globalization nexus is further 
reinforced by positive feedback from economic and financial globalization to political 
democratization.  The exchange of goods and services is a conduit for the exchange of 
ideas, and a more diverse stock of ideas encourages political competition.
4  In financially 
open economies, the government and central bank must be transparent in order to retain 
the confidence of the markets, and transparency spells doom for autocratic regimes.  So 
say those impressed by how the difficulties of managing financial globalization spurred 
the transition to a more open and competitive democratic system in Indonesia.  As we 
                                                 
1 University of California, Berkeley and University of Colorado, Boulder, respectively.  We thank Charles 
Boix, Ernesto Lopez-Cordoba, Chris Meissner, Kevin O’Rourke and Alan Taylor for help with data, 
Sudarat Ananchotikul and Zane Kelly for excellent research assistance, and Marc Flandreau, Harold James, 
and Helen Milner for comments. 
2 See for example Munoz (1994). 
3 See Garrett (2000) or Milner and Kubota (2005).  This of course assumes the feasibility of side payments 
to special interests that might be adversely affected; we return to this below. 
4 In the words of Dailami (2000, p.9), this is the idea that “countries more open to international capital 
flows are also more open to offering political rights and civil liberties to their citizens.”  American political 
leaders are fond of making this point; Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2005) provide some illustrative 
quotations from statements by recent U.S. presidents.  But the point has an esteemed political lineage, from 
Kant (1795) to Huntington (1991) to Przeworski et al. (1996).   2 
document in Figure 1, there have been upward trends in globalization and 
democratization.
5  Between 1975 and 2002, there was a quadrupling in the number of 
democratic countries.  Over the same period, global trade as a share of GDP rose from 
7.7 to 19.5 per cent.  The share of countries open to international capital flows, as 
measured by the International Monetary Fund, rose from 25 to 38 per cent.  Evidently 
there is a powerful dynamic at work. 
  Of course, every causal statement in the preceding paragraph could be 
exaggerated or simply wrong.  While one can point to cases like Central Europe where 
economic opening was encouraged by political democratization, one can equally point to 
cases like Bolivia and Peru where democratization has fueled a popular backlash against 
opening to the rest of the world.  Studies like that by Yu (2005) not only reject the 
hypothesis that democratization leads to openness but in fact conclude in favor of the 
opposite.  Yu rationalizes his finding by observing that concentrated interests may be 
better able to secure the imposition of protectionist policies in democratic political 
systems where they are better represented.  O’Rourke and Taylor (2005) argue similarly 
on the basis of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem: in countries where labor is the scarce 
factor of production, democratic reforms that raise labor’s leverage over policy will 
encourage protectionism rather than opening to the rest of the world.
6  Others suggest that 
democratization will not result in working class support for globalization where domestic 
distortions prevent the benefits of opening from trickling down to the poor.   These 
                                                 
5 The data underlying this figure are described below. 
6 Still others explain cases like Bolivia and Peru, where the working class appears disenchanted with 
globalization, on the grounds that these economies are natural-resource rather than labor abundant and that 
natural resources are more complementary with capital than labor (Perry and Olarreaga 2006). We will 
provide some evidence relevant to this hypothesis below.   3 
perspectives suggest that the relationship running from democracy to globalization is at 
best ambiguous. 
The same point can be made about the relationship running from openness to 
democratization.  While it is possible to point to cases like Indonesia where economic 
and financial opening and the difficulties of autocratic regimes in managing it helped to 
precipitate a shift to democratization, again one can point to cases – here China is a case 
in point – where economic and financial opening have not obviously undermined 
autocratic control.  Again some empirical work is consistent with this skepticism: 
econometric studies by Bussmann (2002), Li and Reuveny (2003) and Rigobon and 
Rodrik (2004) find either no impact of trade openness on democracy or even a negative 
relationship.  Authors like Dailami (2000) caution that capital account liberalization may 
limit the ability of governments to deploy redistributive taxation, regulation, and risk-
sharing policies, thereby weakening support for democratic forms of governance.  That 
there have been parallel trends in the direction of political democratization and economic 
globalization in the last quarter century is undeniable.  But this does not mean that the 
relationship is stable or general.  And correlation does not mean causation.  
  Still, for many people the idea that there are causal connections between 
globalization and democracy is intuitively appealing.  Many social scientists appear to 
harbor the feeling that such relationships exist.  Maybe the data just require additional 
analysis.  There are many more country cases than the examples in our lead paragraph; 
this suggests teasing out the causal connections using a treatment-effects approach to 
compare cases where there were changes in openness and changes in democratization 
with cases where there were not.  The preceding argument suggesting the existence of a   4 
bi-directional relationship between globalization and democracy points to the need for an 
empirical strategy that accounts for the possibility of two-way causality.  And there have 
been previous waves of democratization and globalization; looking over a longer period 
may be useful for uncovering the underlying relationship and establishing the generality – 
or otherwise – of the process. 
  In reality, there has been a great deal of work on these topics, including not a few 
classics.  The idea that globalization promotes the diffusion of democratic ideas goes 
back to Kant (1795).  Authors such as Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1959) and Hayek 
(1960) argued that free trade and capital flows, by enhancing the efficiency of resource 
allocation, raise incomes and lead to the economic development that fosters demands for 
democracy.  Within modern political science, the connections between economic and 
political liberalization is one of the foundational topics of the subfield of international 
political economy.   
Still, none of this previous work has satisfactorily addressed the substantive and 
methodological issues we raise above.  Most studies look only at one of the two causal 
connections, from democracy to globalization or vice versa.  Since they are not 
concerned with two-way causality, sometimes they do not even acknowledge the 
existence of an endogeneity problem, much less develop an appropriate instrumental 
variables strategy for dealing with it.  They rarely acknowledge that democratization has 
different dimensions and that economic globalization entails both the globalization of   5 
trade and the globalization of finance.
7  Few studies take advantage of the fact that there 
have been prior waves of globalization and democratization. 
  These observations provide the point of departure for our own analysis of 
democracy and globalization.  We consider two dimensions of globalization, analyzing 
the determinants and effects of both trade liberalization and capital account liberalization.  
We similarly consider several dimensions of democratization, both as cause and effect.  
We estimate these relationships using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy that we 
think is a step forward relative to previous work. 
  To anticipate, the findings support the hypothesis of a positive two-way 
relationship between democracy and globalization.   Not unlike the assertions of our 
opening paragraph, it does in fact appear that the two variables positively influence one 
another, with reinforcement running in both directions.  However, these effects are not 
uniform across time and space; in particular, the impact of democracy on globalization 
varies with resource endowments and global economic conditions.  General conclusions, 
not surprisingly, remain elusive.  But the evidence here is a start. 
 
2.  Literature 
  Appendix Table 1 summarizes the recent literature on the impact of democracy on 
globalization.  In a relatively early contribution, Grofman and Gray (2000) examined the 
impact on trade openness (imports plus exports as a share of GDP) of the number of years 
a country was under authoritarian rule.  They report a negative effect of authoritarianism 
on trade.  Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), in comparison, consider a larger country sample 
                                                 
7 It should of course include the globalization of labor, although in the most recent wave governments and 
their constituents have been reluctant to accommodate the pressures of globalization that arise in this 
domain.   6 
and a different measure of democracy, drawn from the Polity data set, but report the same 
positive effect of democracy on trade liberalization.
8  However, the study by Yu (2005) 
noted above shows that substituting a still larger country sample and minor changes in 
specification can reverse this result.  Finally, O’Rourke and Taylor (2005) utilize 
historical data from the pre-1913 wave of globalization.
9  They argue that 
democratization that broadens the extent of the franchise should encourage trade 
openness in labor-abundant countries, since labor, which now votes, benefits from trade 
liberalization, but discourage it in labor-scarce countries, following standard Stolpher-
Samuelson logic.  Including a democracy variable and its interaction with a measure of 
the land/labor ratio produces ordinary least squares regression results consistent with this 
supposition. 
Importantly from the present point of view, none of these studies employs an 
instrumental variables strategy.  From this point of view the recent study by Milner and 
Kubota (2005) is a step forward.  The authors measure trade openness in a number of 
ways, including the unweighted average statutory tariff rate and the Sachs-Warner index 
of economic openness.
10  They similarly measure democracy in a number of ways: the 
now-standard Polity index, Geddes’ (1999) data on autocracy, and Przeworksi et al.’s 
(2000) dichotomous index of democratic regimes.  While most of their estimates are by 
ordinary least squares (they argue on a priori grounds that reverse causality running from 
trade openness to the political regime is unlikely to be important), they also report some 
                                                 
8 Precise procedures followed in studies utilizing information from the Polity data set vary, but typically 
they follow Gurr et al. (1990) in combining information on the competitiveness of the process for selecting 
the chief executive, the openness of that process, institutional constrains on the chief executive’s decision 
making power, the competitiveness of political participation, and the existence of binding rules on political 
participation. 
9 Which limits their analysis to three dozen countries. 
10 As constructed originally by Sachs and Warner (1995) and updated by Wacziarg and Horn Welch (2003).   7 
instrumental variables estimates.  The average age of the party system and the level of 
secondary school completion are used as instruments for democracy.  While only one 
regression is reported (tariff rates regressed on the Polity-based measure of democracy), 
the previously-reported positive effect continues to hold. 
A parallel strand of work looks at the impact of democracy on financial openness.  
Quinn (2000), using democracy and autocracy indicators from the Polity data set and his 
own measure of capital account openness, finds that democracies are more likely to 
remove capital controls.  Brune and Guisinger (2003), using an alternative measure of the 
dependent variable in conjunction with the democracy indicator of Przeworski et al. 
(2000), similarly report a positive impact of democratic openness on financial openness, 
especially when the democratic government in power is “capital friendly” and “right 
leaning.”  Again, however, neither study acknowledges the possibility of endogeneity.
11 
Appendix Table 2 summarizes recent empirical research on the effect of 
economic and financial globalization on democracy.  Bussmann (2001), Li and Reuveny 
(2003), Rigobon and Rodrik (2004), and Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) all consider the 
impact of trade openness on a Polity-based measure of democratization.  Li and Reuveny 
report a negative impact, but questions can be raised about the adequacy of their method 
of dealing with the endogeneity of trade, which is by lagging the independent variable.  
Rigobon and Rodrik (2004), invoking identification through heteroskedasticity, similarly 
find a negative impact.  Bussmann and Giavazzi-Tabellini, in contrast, find no impact of 
trade openness on democracy.  Giavazzi and Tabellini rely on a difference in differences 
methodology; they compare countries where there were transitions to or from greater 
                                                 
11 This despite the fact that Quinn acknowledges the possibility of reserve causality from international 
financial liberalization to subsequent democratic reversals.   8 
openness with countries where the regime remained unchanged instead of attempting to 
control explicitly for endogeneity.  Bussmann instruments her trade openness variable, 
but questions can be raised about whether her instruments -- GDP per capita, investment 
and government consumption – satisfy the exogeneity and exclusion restrictions.
12  Rudra 
(2005) argues that the effect of trade openness on democratization is positive but 
contingent – that one finds a positive impact only in countries with high or rising levels 
of social spending (where there exists a social safety net).
13  Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2005) limit their sample to initially non-democratic countries and conclude that trade 
openness plays a significant role in driving transitions to democracy. 
A relatively sophisticated study in this vein is Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 
(2005), who use the gravity model to obtain instruments for trade.  They regress 
democracy on fitted values of trade where trade is a function of population and the 
distance between trading partners.  They also use historical data starting in 1870.  In 
contrast to most of the studies just described, they find a positive impact of trade 
openness on democratization.  This positive relationship is not limited to particular 
“waves” of democratization.  Yu (2005) estimates similar relationships over a shorter 
period and obtains similar results. 
We are aware of only two studies touching on the impact of international financial 
openness on democratization.  Relying on timing for identification, Quinn (2001) finds 
that financial openness increases the probability of transitions away from democracy.  
                                                 
12 For example, there is a large literature in which it is argued that income levels (GDP per capita, in other 
words) is affected by democratization. 
13 We find this result a bit perplexing.  The positive conditioning effect of the existence of a social safety 
net would be easier to understand in a regression of trade openness on political variables (rather than the 
opposite of what we describe here), on Rodrik (1998) grounds (that, in more open economies, societies 
demand better-developed social safety nets).   9 
Rudra (2005) finds the opposite: a positive relationship but one that is again contingent 
on rising levels of social spending (paralleling her argument about the contingent effects 
of trade openness).  
In sum, a number of studies find evidence of a positive relationship running from 
democracy to globalization, although this conclusion is not unanimous and questions can 
be raised about methodology and therefore about the robustness of findings.  As for the 
impact of trade openness on democracy, early studies generally reported no significant 
relationship, while more recent work finds in favor of a positive link.  Work on the 
impact of financial openness on democracy is too scanty to support firm conclusions. 
 
3.  Identification 
  Research on the connections between democracy and economic openness is only 
as convincing as its identification strategy.  We therefore start with a discussion of the 
instrumental variables used in our analysis.   
  Studies of the impact of trade openness on democracy have utilized the gravity 
model to identify the exogenous component of trade.  The gravity model looks to country 
size on the grounds that smaller countries produce a narrower range of inputs and outputs 
and hence benefit from exchanging these with the rest of the world, and to distance from 
a country’s trading partners as a measure of transport costs.  If it has shown nothing else, 
the resulting literature has shown that size and distance are robustly related to trade.  Both 
variables are plausibly exogenous over the annual horizon that is the focus of our 
analysis.
14   
                                                 
14 Alesina and Spolaore (2003) suggest reasons why trade may feed back to country size in the intermediate 
and long run.   10 
A question is whether they also satisfy the exclusion restriction for valid 
instruments.  We are not aware of arguments linking country size to democratization.  
Casual empiricism does not point in one direction or the other.
15  Similarly, it is not 
obvious why a country’s distance from the world’s major markets should affect its 
political regime.  Once again there are examples pointing in both directions.
16  All this is 
consistent with the idea that the basic arguments of the gravity model are plausible 
instruments for identifying the exogenous component of trade.
17 
One strand of literature on the political economy of capital controls argues by way 
of analogy with merchandise trade: small countries have the greatest difficulty in 
producing a diversified portfolio of financial assets and hence the greatest incentive to 
engage in financial trade.
18  Another appeals to theories of optimal taxation, arguing that 
where the inflation tax is higher and fiscal imbalances are more severe the authorities will 
have a greater tendency to tax capital imports.
19  We are not aware of convincing 
evidence that democracies have lower (or higher) inflation rates or smaller (or larger) 
budget deficits; we take this as suggesting that inflation and budget deficits plausibly 
satisfy the exogeneity condition.  Similarly, we have not identified a literature in which 
these variables independently affect the political regime and hence violate the exclusion 
criterion.  A final strand of literature considers global determinants of countries’ choice 
                                                 
15 For every United States there is a China, and for every El Salvador there is a Togo. 
16 For every New Zealand there is a Turkmenistan. 
17 One may worry about the possibility that who a country trades with is a function of its political regime.  
Hence if the distance variable is taken as a weighted average of the distance to a country’s principal trading 
partners, the resulting measure will have an endogenous component.  We therefore compute this variable as 
the distance from a country to the world’s other markets (weighting distance to each individual country by 
the latter’s share in world trade rather than by its share in the subject country’s trade).  One may also worry 
that country size is endogenous with respect to the political regime (democracy comes to Czechoslovakia 
and the country splits into two).  The response would be that such changes in country size are heavily 
dictated by historical factors and in the short run are few and far between. 
18  See Martin and Rey (2005) and Driessen and Laeven (2005).  The second pair of authors emphasizes the 
advantages of financial trade not just for small countries but for small developing countries in particular. 
19 See e.g. Grilli (1995).   11 
of international financial regime, pointing to peer effects (capital account openness is 
more likely when many other countries have opened in previous periods) and systemic-
stability effects (capital account openness is less likely when there have been a large 
number of currency crises in previous periods).
20  Both timing and the small country 
assumption, which is appropriate for most of our observations, support the maintained 
hypothesis of the exogeneity of these instruments.  And it is not clear why these variables 
should affect the political regime other than via policies toward the capital account (in 
other words, they plausibly satisfy the exclusion restriction). 
We make use of all of these literatures to identify instruments for capital account 
policies.  Our consolidated list of candidates for instrumental variables thus includes 
country size, inflation, the budget deficit, the number of other countries with capital 
controls, and the number of other countries experiencing currency crises.
21 
  The literature on democratization provides potential instruments for the political 
regime.  A long line of authors have argued that democratic political institutions arise in 
an environment where a relatively affluent and homogeneous populace has experience 
with or exposure to participatory politics.  This observation points to the connection 
between democracy and the general level of economic and social development, as 
proxied by, inter alia, per capita wealth or income.
22  But we cannot use wealth or per 
capital income as instruments for democracy as they do not satisfy the exclusion 
restriction – that is, they almost certainly has an independent impact on the propensity to 
engage in commercial and financial trade.  Recent studies of democratization do however 
                                                 
20 See the work by Simmons and Elkins (2004). 
21 All lagged, as they typically are in empirical studies of the incidence and determinants of capital controls. 
22 This relationship has attracted an enormous amount of attention over the years – to the extent that it has 
its own name, “modernization theory” – and is in resurgence thanks, in part, to the contributions of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2005).  Precursors range from Lipset (1959) to Dahl (1989) to Huntington (1991).   12 
point to other factors playing a causal role in the emergence of democracy.  Sachs and 
Warner (2001) and Ross (2001) have focused on countries’ natural resource endowments, 
arguing that greater reliance on mineral exports leads to concentrated power, reducing the 
probability that dictatorships will become democratic.  But again there may be reasons to 
worry about the exclusion restriction; countries specializing in the production of natural 
resources may be more inclined to trade, insofar as they depend and/or can afford to 
import a range of other goods.   
Other approaches may be more promising.  For example, Przeworski et al. (2000) 
argue that transitions to democracy are more likely in former British colonies, where 
citizens or their forbearers had positive experience with democratic practice, and when 
there an increasing number of other countries in the international system are also 
democratic. They also argue that democratic transitions are less likely in countries with a 
history of frequent transitions between democracy and dictatorship, where experience 
with democracy has been less satisfactory.
23  This variable is also likely to satisfy the 
exclusion restriction for a valid instrument in an equation explaining economic and 
financial openness; we know of no study that has demonstrated a link running from 
regime transitions, constitutional age or systematic democratization to globalization.
 24  
These variables are also plausibly exogenous with respect to economic and financial 
openness: only with effort can one can construct an argument relating trade or capital 
                                                 
23 Country studies point in the same direction; see McLean (2006).  While cast in terms of government 
quality, La Porta, et al (1999) also find a positive relationship between British colonial heritage and 
democracy; conversely, they find a negative relationship between socialist legal heritage and democracy.  
In addition to the findings of Przeworski, et al, evidence supporting the hypothesis that political stability is 
conducive to the emergence of democracy is provided by Boix and Stokes (2003) and Epstein, et al (2006), 
although the former measure stability in terms of the age of the country’s constitution and the latter 
conceive of stability in terms of the country’s prior transitions to dictatorship. 
24 The  literature studying the “democratic peace” finds that democracies trade more with one another; this, 
however, is not the same as suggesting that a system comprised of more democracies will have an ever 
larger volume of international trade.   13 
market liberalization today to prior experiences with dictatorship, constitutional age, or 
colonial experience.  
  Again, we draw on all these studies in what follows.  Our instrument list for 
democracy is comprised of the number of other democracies in the international system, 
the number of prior transitions to dictatorship, the country’s constitutional age, and 
British colonial heritage.    
 
4.  Data 
We examine the relationship between democracy and globalization in as large a 
sample as possible using the longest historical time series available.  We use data on trade, 
capital controls, democracy and the requisite instruments annually for the period 1870-
2000.  Our sample broadens over time as a result of the existence of a growing number of 
independent states and greater data availability.  The sample of countries for which 
comparable data on international trade exist begins with 14 in 1870, doubles by the end 
of World War I (to 28), doubles again by the end of World War II (to 56), and reaches a 
maximum of 156 by 1998.  Our sample for capital controls expands in analogous fashion.   
We measure trade openness as imports plus exports as a percentage of gross 
domestic product.
25  As a robustness check we also employ the dichotomous measure of 
trade liberalization constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and extended by Wacziarg 
and Welch (2004).  Sachs and Warner classify a country as closed if non-tariff barriers 
cover 40 per cent or more of trade, average tariff rates are 40 per cent or more, the black 
                                                 
25 Our primary sources for import and export data are the compilations published by Mitchell (various 
dates) and Banks (various dates).  Gross domestic product data comes primarily from Maddison (2001), 
supplemented by Mitchell (various dates) and Banks (various dates).  Specifics regarding the creation of 
the trade openness and GDP series are contained in the appendix.   14 
market exchange rate depreciated by 20 per cent or more relative to the official exchange 
rate, or a socialist economy existed.  This measure is available from 1950-2000 and 
covers 150 plus countries.
26 
Capital controls are measured in the manner of the International Monetary Fund’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (EAER), 
supplemented with historical sources.  EAER seeks to capture whether there are explicit 
legal restrictions on capital transitions.  The IMF is the source for this variable from 
1950; for the period 1870-1950 we rely on the coding of Eichengreen and Bordo (2003). 
For democracy we employ the dichotomous measure proposed by Przeworski et 
al. (1990), who argue that a country should be regarded as democratic if governments are 
chosen in contested elections.  This means that a country is coded as democratic if it has 
elections where more than one party competes and it is not the case that the same party 
always wins.  The authors provide data for 150 countries covering 1950-1990; Boix and 
Rosato (2001) extend these data backward to 1800 while Cheibub and Ghandi (2005) 
update them through 2000. 
An alternative is the age or maturity of the political regime.  The dichotomous 
measure would code, say, Britain and Croatia as equally democratic (both would be 
coded “1”), notwithstanding the fact that the two countries are fundamentally different in 
terms of their cumulated experience with open political competition.  One way of 
quantifying these differences is by constructing a measure of the length of time a country 
has been a democracy.  Our measure, “Age of Democracy,” counts for each country i at 
time t the number of uninterrupted year up to time t that country i has been democratic. 
                                                 
26 We are aware of the critique that the Sachs-Warner measure is dominated by the black-market-premium 
component.  As such, it is probably best interpreted as capturing a combination of trade and exchange 
restrictions (in which case it is, however, still relevant to our questions).   15 
We also employ data from the POLITY project, which codes countries’ level of 
democracy as a function of institutional rules.  It is less concerned with turnover per se 
than Przeworski et al.  For sake of comparison we construct a dummy variable coded one 
if the POLITY score is strictly positive and zero otherwise.  We also use the POLITY 
data set to create a measure of age of democracy in a manner similar to that described 
above. 
POLITY is also the source of information on constitutional age.  POLITY defines 
constitutional change as occurring either when there is a political transition or when the 
absolute value of the score changes by at least three points.  This allows for constitutional 
changes in both democracies and dictatorships. 
 
5.  Methods 
Estimation of instrumental variables models on a large sample of countries 
observed over more than a century raises the prospect of heteroscedasticity and serially 
correlated errors.  Heteroscedasticity renders standard errors generated via textbook IV 
inconsistent.
27  A framework for dealing with heteroscedasticity of unknown form is 
provided by the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM).  We therefore estimate our 
IV models by GMM and report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to 
heteroscedastic and serially correlated residuals.
28 
                                                 
27 Which would prevent us from drawing valid inferences.  Utilizing robust (or heteroscedasticity-
consistent) standard errors only partially solves the problem as IV estimates generated by OLS are 
inefficient (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2003). 
28 The GMM estimator is more efficient in the face of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation than standard 
IV estimation and, if the errors are neither heteroscedastic nor serially correlated, it fares no worse.  A 
detailed discussion of the implementation of the Generalized Methods of Moments estimator is contained 
in Hayashi (2000) who develops the IV estimator within the context of GMM.   In addition, several key 
tests important for identification within the context of instrumental variables estimation can be 
implemented within the context of GMM estimation, again as described by Hayashi.   16 
While we utilize the literatures in economics and political science to identity our 
lists of candidate instrumental variables, as described above in Section 3, we use 
statistical tests to verify their relevance (strength) and exogeneity (that they satisfy the 
exclusion restriction).  Consider first the question of relevance and a simple regression 
model of the form: 
Y = a + bX + e                                                                               (1) 
where Y is the dependent variable (for example, trade) and X is the independent variable 
of interest that is thought to be endogenously determined (for example, democracy).  An 
instrument for X—a variable Z (for example, colonial heritage)—is relevant if the 
correlation between X and Z is non-zero.  (In our present example, Przeworski et al. 2000 
suggest that colonial heritage should be correlated with democracy.)  But if the 
correlation between X and Z is small, then Z is a weak instrument and inferences based 
on IV estimation are likely biased.  We rely on two tests to evaluate the relevance (or 
strength) of our instruments.  First, we calculate an F-test for the exclusion of the 
instrument(s) based on the first stage regression and consider our instrument(s) valid if 
the F-statistic exceeds ten (the threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock 1997). Second, 
we use the Cragg-Donald test of the null that the model is underidentified—that Z does 
not sufficiently identify X.  Only if the instrument(s) satisfy both tests do we proceed. 
One approach to “solving” the instrument-relevance problem would be to utilize 
all of the variables identified in Section 3 as potential instruments for democracy.  Then 
we would surely obtain a strong correlation between X and these Z’s.  But this kitchen-
sink approach might well violate the assumption that the instruments Z are orthogonal—
that is, uncorrelated—with the error term e.  The more instruments we use, the more   17 
likely that some of them will have an independent impact on the dependent variable.  If Z 
is not orthogonal to e then the model is overidentified.  Hansen (1982) has developed a 
test of overidentifying restrictions in a GMM context—Hansen’s J statistic—which we 
use to test the null hypothesis that the model is not overidentified. 
Satisfying the requirements of instrument relevance and exogeneity is especially 
challenging in the context of this paper, as we are seek instruments that not only are valid 
over time and across country but that are also robust across various definitions of 
openness and democracy.  Our approach is to start with a comprehensive set of 
instruments—those identified as theoretically relevant in the literature discussed in 
Section 3.  Predictably, these lists generally satisfy the instrument relevance requirement 
but fail the test for overidentification.  Using the discussion in Section 3, which points to 
some potential instruments as more plausibly exogenous than others, we then move to a 
reduced set of instruments and reexamine the relevant test statistics.  The results reported 
below are based on these more parsimonious instrument lists.
29 
Two of our dependent variables – one measure of democracy and our measure of 
capital controls—are dichotomous.  The standard approach in this instance, that of 
estimating a logit or probit model, is not appropriate; at least we are unaware of an IV 
estimator for a dichotomous dependent variable when the error term is serially correlated 
and heteroscedastic.
30  Instead, we therefore estimate linear probability models.  This 
                                                 
29 These procedures did not produce a magic instrument list; that is, we found that different Z variables 
served as valid instruments depending on the definitions of globalization and democracy used and the time 
period examined.  This is not surprising: globalization and democratization were plausibly determined by 
different factors during 1870-1913, for example, as compared with the period 1970-2000. 
30 Similarly, statistical tests for instrument relevance and exogeneity analogous to those discussed above 
have yet to be developed in the context of logit or probit models.   18 
means that parameter estimates cannot be interpreted in terms of probabilities and 
predicted values may fall outside the zero-one interval.
31 
  Finally, we include period fixed effects in all our specifications, in the form of 
dummy variables for the interwar, Bretton Woods, and post-Bretton Woods periods (the 
gold standard period being the omitted alternative).
32  Period dummies pick up the 
possibility that there may be “waves” of democratization (or trade opening, or capital 
account liberalization) occurring simultaneously, at particular points in time in multiple 
countries, for reasons beyond those for which we can control.
33  Our decision to specify 
the period fixed effects in this way reflects our reading of the historical literatures on 
globalization and democracy, much of which adopts this periodization. 
 
6.  Results 
Table 1 reports results for the impact of the dichotomous measure of democracy 
on trade openness.  Controlling for other determinants of trade highlighted by the gravity 
model, the results suggest that democracies trade more than dictatorships.
34  This holds 
for the entire 1870-2000 period as well as for the gold standard era, the interwar period, 
                                                 
31 Note that the statistics we report for instrument relevance and exogeneity are heteroscedasticity robust so 
the use of GMM in the context of a discrete dependent variable does not adversely affect these important 
statistical tests. 
32 When we consider the Sachs-Warner measure of trade openness, since exists only from 1950, we 
distinguish only the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods periods. 
33 Another way of thinking about these period fixed effects are that they correct for the possibility of 
changes in the structural relationship over time. 
34 Note also that the control variables are well determined and enter with plausible signs.  Greater distance 
from the principal markets leads to less trade; larger countries trade, more but with an elasticity closer to 
zero than one; more populous countries trade more; richer countries trade a smaller share of GDP, other 
things equal, reflecting the presence of a larger service sector.   19 
the Bretton Woods years, and the Post Bretton Woods period alike.  The effect of 
democracy across each of these periods is positive and statistically significant.
35     
When we instead measure the political regime by the age of democracy, as in 
Table 2, we find a similar pattern: more mature democracies are more open to trade.  We 
obtain this result in the full sample and for each subperiod.
36  Note that this is a 
generalization of the result found previously by O’Rourke and Taylor (2006) for the gold 
standard era using ordinary least squares.   
Tables 3 and 4 report analogous estimates for financial openness, where the 
dependent variable equals one in the presence of capital controls.  These results again 
support the idea of a positive relationship running from democracy to globalization: that 
is, democracies are more likely to remove capital controls.  We find this for the full 
sample and each subperiod regardless of the measure of democracy employed, with one 
exception.  Under Bretton Woods, democracies were more likely than dictatorships to 
implement capital controls.  (This positive impact is statistically significant using the 
dichotomous measure of democracy, as in Table 3, but not when using the age of 
democracy, as in Table 4.
37)  This finding would appear to reflect the tendency for 
advanced democracies that were part of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange 
rates to use capital controls to free up monetary policy to serve constituent demands, the 
idea at the time being that there was a stable tradeoff between inflation and 
                                                 
35 As discussed above, to properly identify the effect of democracy we had to rely on different sets of 
instruments in different equations.  In some cases, like that of post Bretton Woods period, when we used 
the complete set of instruments we were unable to reject the null of overidentification at the 0.05 percent 
level.  Dropping instruments—either total number of other democracies or former British Colony—from 
this model did allow us to reject the null of overidentification but resulted in weak instruments (a F statistic 
below 10). 
36 These models are better identified from a statistical point of view: the specification for each subperiod 
passes tests for instrument relevance and exogeneity. 
37 This result should, however, be interpreted with caution, since the models in question fails the test for 
overidentification.   20 
unemployment that could be exploited by national monetary authorities.  When 
democracies allowed their exchange rates to float following the breakdown Bretton 
Woods, controls were not longer required for monetary policy autonomy.
38   
Tables 5 through 8 complete the picture, with evidence on the impact of trade and 
financial openness on democracy.  Consider first the results for the impact of trade 
openness on democracy (Tables 5 and 6).  With a single exception—the effect of trade on 
the continuous measure of democracy in the Bretton Woods era—we find that trade 
openness promotes democracy.
39  The results (in Tables 7 and 8) for the impact of 
financial openness on democracy are not as strong but still point in the same direction.  
Using the dichotomous measure of democracy, we find that capital controls made 
democracy less likely during both the interwar and post-Bretton Woods periods, although 
we do not find a statistically significant effect when we pool all years.  When we use the 
age of democracy (Table 8) we find that capital controls have a statistically significant 
and negative effect for all periods except Bretton Woods.
40   
In Table 9 we include proxies for these two dimensions of globalization at the 
same time.  Both retain their expected signs but they display different patterns in terms of 
individual statistical significance depending on how democracy is measure.  Given that 
both are instrumented using a common set of exogenous variables the lack of individual 
                                                 
38 In addition, the idea that central banks could affect the equilibrium level of unemployment fell out of 
fashion as a result of accumulated experience and the growing intellectual sway of the Phelps-Friedman 
expectations-augmented Phillips Curve, which presumably reduced the value that some central banks 
attached to policy autonomy. 
39 With one exception we use a single instrument for trade in each specification.  We do this because the 
inclusion of any of the other gravity-motivated variables (population, area, economic size) fails the 
overidentification test.  The Bretton Woods sample in Table 6 includes both distance and area because 
distance by itself resulted in a situation where the model failed the test for instrument relevance (the F-
statistic was 5.35 using just distance). 
40 Again, however, caution is in order as our instruments for the sample as a whole (1870-2000) fall below 
the cut-off of 10 (F=8.38) yet the Cragg-Donald test allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the model is 
underidentified.   21 
significance is not surprising; a chi-squared test for their joint significant (at the bottom 
of Table 9) shows that they are jointly significant at the 0.05 level.  This evidence is 
supportive of the idea that both aspects of globalization matter for democracy.
41 
  In sum, we find evidence of positive relationships running in both directions 
between globalization and democracy. 
 
7.  Robustness 
It is important to establish the robustness of such findings.  We study robustness 
in several ways: we consider alternative measures of our dependent and independent 
variables; we use alternative econometric set-ups; and, perhaps most importantly, we 
consider alternative instruments.
42   
Alternative measures.  Given the existence of alternative codings of political 
regimes, we substituted the POLITY measure of democracy for that of Przeworski et al.  
We construct a dummy variable coded one if the POLITY score is strictly positive and 
zero otherwise.  Using these data we also construct an alternative measure of the age of 
democracy.
43 
                                                 
41 When we examine this relationship across subperiods we find a similar pattern for the interwar period 
and the post-Bretton Wood period.  We found no statistically significant effect of trade and capital 
openness on democracy during the Bretton Woods period (and could not identify instruments that satisfied 
both relevance and exogeneity concerns).  We did not estimate a similar model for the gold standard 
because no country had capital controls during that period. 
42 To avoid a proliferation of tables, we describe but do not print the tables associated with all of the 
following robustness tests.  The additional results are available from the authors on request. 
43 The dichotomous measures of democracy from Przeworski and POLITY agree 88 per cent of the time; 
the major disagreements arise when countries have competitive electoral systems yet do not yet meet the 
suffrage requirement that is part of the Przeworski, et al definition.  The correlation between the age of 
democracy measures is 81 per cent.   22 
When we substitute the POLITY measure for the Przeworski et al measure, we 
obtain results substantively and statistically similar to those reported in Section 5.
44  This 
is true when we use democracy both as an independent and a dependent variable. 
Similarly, when we substitute the Sachs-Warner measure of openness for the trade 
share, we continue to find that democracy has a positive impact on trade openness.  This 
is true for both the continuous and dichotomous measures of democracy and both with 
and without geographical instruments (Table 10).  Since the Sachs-Warner measure is 
only available since 1950, this test also entailed limiting the analysis to the second half of 
the 20
th century.  We also therefore reestimated the relationship using the export-plus-
import share on this shorter period; again the results carry over.   
Alternative econometric specifications.  As a further robustness check we 
included a set of n-1 country dummy variables in the trade and age-of-democracy models 
estimated over the 1870-2000 period.
45  With the exception of the impact of capital 
controls on the age of democracy model (Table 8), our results are unchanged, although 
some of the point estimates are now smaller than before.
46 
We also estimated the models using standard instrumental variables, OLS, and 
probit-based specifications. Results using these techniques suggested the same patterns as 
reported above and even higher levels of statistical significance than above.  For example, 
                                                 
44 There is an exception: when we use the dichotomous measure of democracy based on the POLITY score 
we no longer find a statistically significant impact of capital controls on the probability of democracy (the 
parallel regression is column 2 of table 3).  These results are available upon request. 
45 Adding country dummies meant that we had to drop the British colonial origin instrument. 
46 We did not include country fixed effects in the capital controls or dichotomous democracy models 
because there are a number of countries where the dependent variable of interest (democracy or capital 
controls) does not change over time.  In those cases the inclusion of country dummies would result in a 
large number of cases being “perfectly explained.”     23 
we found a statistically significant and negative relationship between capital controls and 
democracy using instrumental variables probit.
47 
Another robustness check was to focus on transitions to and from democracy 
rather than on the political regime at a point in time.  We estimated a Markov transition 
model of the impact of globalization on democratization.  This allows us to ask the 
question: conditional on a country being a democracy at time t-1, does globalization 
increase (or decrease) the probability of a transition to dictatorship?  It allows us to 
analyze within a single empirical model both the probability that a country will undergo a 
political transition and the probability that the existing regime will remain stable. 
Denote democracy for country i at time t as Dit and the indicator of globalization 
in country I at time t as Git.
48  We can write the Markov transition model as a probit: 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 ( ) { } it it it it it P D G D D G a a b b - - - - = F + + +  
where P(Dit) is the probability that the country will be democratic, and ￿ is the 
cumulative normal distribution.  When a country is a dictatorship at time t-1 (Dit-1=1), the 
impact of globalization on the probability of democracy at time t is given by ￿1.   A 
statistically significant positive (negative) value of ￿1 is interpreted as evidence that 
globalization increases (decreases) the probability of a transition to democracy.  Likewise, 
if a country is democratic at time t-1, a positive (negative) sum ￿1 + ￿1 suggests that 
globalization raises (reduces) democratic stability – that a country that is democratic at 
time t-1 will remain so at time at t.  Hence each model of Markov results have two 
columns.  The first one (denoted ￿) contains the coefficients when democracy at t-1 is 
equal to zero and can be interpreted in terms of transitions to/from democracy.  The 
                                                 
47 This is largely due to the fact that those models do not allow for standard errors that are auto-correlation 
consistent. 
48 For the ease of exposition we ignore other independent variables that may influence democracy.   24 
second (denoted ￿+￿) reports the coefficients when democracy at t-1 is equal to one and 
can be interpreted in terms of democratic stability.
49 
The results, in Table 11, are consistent with earlier results.  For trade openness, 
we find that autocracies that are more open to trade are likely to remain autocracies (the 
negative coefficient under ￿ in column 1) and that democracies that are open to trade are 
likely to remain democracies (the positive coefficient under ￿ + ￿ in column 1).  For 
financial openness (the second set of columns in table 11), we find no impact of capital 
controls on democracy but find that democracies that are closed to capital flows are likely 
to become autocracies.
50  When we include both measures of globalization, in the third 
set of columns, the results become weaker.
51  These results there do not suggest 
consistent impact on the probability of a transition to democracy, but they do point to the 
conclusion that economically and financially open economies are more likely to remain 
democratic.  
 
8.  Contingent Effects  
The literature suggests a number of directions in which one might want to extend 
these results.  For example, O’Rourke and Taylor (2005) suggest that the impact of 
democratization on openness should be contingent a country’s factor endowment: 
democratization increases the likelihood that policy reflects the interests of workers, who 
now vote, and workers will prefer trade openness in labor abundant countries. It is 
                                                 
49 The standard errors in the ￿+￿ column are based on a Wald test of the joint significance of the two terms.  
A complication in estimating the Markov model is that we have two endogenous variables: the measure of 
globalization and its interaction with lagged democracy.  As the value of the interaction term is a function 
of the endogenous globalization variable, we treat both the globalization variable and its interaction with 
lagged democracy as endogenous and instrument both of them. 
50 Again, the language here is stretched as we are estimating linear probability models. 
51 Due to collinearity resulting from a common set of instruments.   25 
assumed that the impact of opening on relative returns to factors of production can be 
predicted from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, and that factor owners vote their interests.  
It is further assumed that prior to democratization, which enfranchises labor, decision 
making is controlled by large landowners and wealthy capitalists.
52   
Following O’Rourke and Taylor, we therefore interact democracy with the 
land/labor ratio.
53  Again we use the fitted value of democracy from the first-stage 
regression and include democracy by itself as well as the interaction term in the second 
stage.  Results are in Table 12.
54  While we continue to get a positive coefficient for the 
impact of democracy on trade, we also get negative coefficient on the interaction of 
democracy with the land/labor ratio. The Stolper-Samuelson interpretation, with two 
factors and two sectors, would be that where labor is the relatively scarce factor, it is 
landowners who benefit from opening, both relatively and absolutely, and labor when 
enfranchised is better able to vote its pocketbook.  We find this pattern for the full period 
1870-2000.  We find it also for the 1870-1913 period on which O’Rourke and Taylor 
focus (although their estimates, unlike ours, are by ordinary least squares) and for the 
other subperiods as well.  The individual coefficients are not always significant; again, 
this is a consequence of using an identical set of instruments to identify both of these 
endogenous variables; a ￿
2 test shows them to be jointly significant.
55 
                                                 
52 Verdier (1994) uses this framework to examine historical trade policy in Britain, France and the United 
States.  Dutt and Mishra (2002) also employ a similar model and apply it trade policy across a broad cross-
section of countries. 
53 We follow O’Rourke and Taylor and standardize the land/labor ratio to mean zero.  We obtained data for 
the land-labor ratio from O’Rourke and Taylor for the period prior to 1939 and from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators for the period after 1960. 
54 Note that in this model and those that follow we treat both democracy and the interaction of democracy 
with the land-labor ratio (and the capital-labor ratio, below) as endogenous.   
55 That the endogenous variables are correlated with one another by construction adds to the problem of 
having sufficient independent variation.   26 
In Table 13 we add the capital/labor-democracy interaction.
56  Capital stocks, 
even more historical capital stocks, tend to be measured with error; it is thus not 
surprising that individual significance levels are now lower.  But for the full period, 
democracy continues to display its positive association with trade openness.  Its 
interaction with the land/labor ratio is again negative, while its interaction with the 
capital/labor ratio is positive.
57  The three variables are jointly significant at conventional 
confidence levels.
58  This begins to look like a specific-factors model in which land and 
labor are used in one sector (“agriculture”) while capital and labor are used in the other 
(“industry”).  Landowners and capitalists have opposing preferences.  With which one 
labor sides depends on its consumption basket, and how effectively it makes its 
preferences felt depends on the extent of democratization.
59  We obtain the same results 
for the interwar period and the Bretton Woods years (but not for the post-Bretton Woods 
period, when democracy is insignificant and its interaction with the land/labor ratio is 
positive, not negative). 
Where capital is the relatively abundant factor it should prefer the removal of 
capital controls, which opens up opportunities for investing abroad, while where it is the 
relatively scarce factor it should prefer a closed capital account in order to avoid having 
its rate of return bid down by capital inflows.  In a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, this idea 
builds on the well-known isomorphism between trade flows and factor flows (Mundell 
                                                 
56 The models in Table 13 (and Table 14 below) include three endogenous variables: democracy and its 
interaction with the land/labor and capital/labor ratios.   
57 In other words, that the capital stock was not included in the previous table doesn’t appear to have 
affected anything there. 
58 See the ￿
2-tests at the bottom of the table. 
59 In general it is not possible to make reliable predictions about how factor proportions will map into 
preferences about trade policy in a three-factor, two-good model, as noted by O’Rourke and Taylor (2005) 
and shown by Thompson (1985, 1986).  One must make further assumptions, like those required to obtain 
the specific-factors model, in order to derive unambiguous implications.   27 
1957).  We therefore estimated the same equations, with interaction terms, for the 
determinants of capital account policies.  Results are in Table 14.  Reassuringly, for the 
full period 1870-2000 (first column) the pattern of coefficients is consistent with what we 
found in Table 13 for trade flows.  (Recall that the dependent variable in Table 14 is 
capital controls, so we consistency means obtaining the opposite signs on democracy and 
on its interaction with the factor proportions ratios.)   Democracy enters with a negative 
coefficient – it makes capital controls less likely.  This effect is stronger in countries with 
high capital/labor ratios and weaker in those with high land/labor ratios.  The coefficients 
on two of the three terms (democracy and its interaction with the capital/labor ratio) are 
individually significant, and the three terms (democracy and the two interactions) are 
jointly significant.  We find the same thing for the post-1960 period (column 3).  For the 
interwar period, in contrast, none of the effects is significant.  These were years – 
especially the 1930s – when capital controls were almost universal; they were imposed in 
response to the economic crisis and the breakdown of international financial markets.  It 
is not surprising, then, that we observe the same tendency to apply them in democracies 
and autocracies and in countries with very different factor proportions. 
 
9.  Conclusions and Extensions 
  In this paper we have presented a battery of evidence suggesting positive 
relationships running both ways between globalization and democracy, though exceptions 
to this generalization appear to obtain at particular times (during the Bretton Woods 
period) and places (in labor-scarce countries).   As in any case where positive feedbacks 
are present, there is the possibility of dynamic instability – that is, a positive or negative   28 
shock may send the system off in the positive or negative direction without limit.  Here 
we offer a few speculations about this possibility. 
Our inferences about dynamics are just suggestive, given the basically static 
system that we have estimated.
60  But such speculations are intriguing.  If the system is 
dynamically unstable, then we can perhaps understand how in the 1930s negative shocks 
to trade and democracy could send the system down toward progressively lower values of 
both variables, seemingly without limit (at least until the system was shocked again after 
World War II).  Analogously, dynamic instability implies that we may now be witnessing 
positively reinforcing increases in globalization and democracy that will similarly 
continue without limit (absent, of course, a large negative shock that sends the system off 
in the other direction).  But if the system is stable – despite the existence of positive two-
way relationships between democracy and globalization – then we perhaps have a way of 
understanding how the “third wave” of democratization after 1978 lent some 
encouragement to globalization, but not without limit.  We have a way of understanding 
how the decline in transport costs due to containerization encouraged trade and also lent 
impetus to democratization, but again only within limits.  In this stable case, both 
democracy and globalization eventually settle down at levels higher than prior to the 
shock, because there is resistance to allowing them to rise further.  Some might say that 
this is a plausible characterization of what we have seen in recent years. 
  When the bivariate relationships between two variables are both positive, 
undergraduates are taught to gauge stability by comparing the own effects to the cross 
effects.  In the present context the question is whether the globalization-as-a-function-of-
                                                 
60 There is, of course, a lagged dependent variable in our determinants-of-democracy Markov equations, 
which gives the system a modestly dynamic flavor, but it does not have important implications for our story.   29 
democracy curve is steeper than the democracy-as-a-function of globalization curve when 
plotted with democracy on the horizontal axis and globalization on the vertical axis.
61  
For illustrative purposes, we calculated the relative slopes of the two loci for the case of 
trade.
62  The estimated configuration is in Figure 2.
63   
This is the stable case.  Imagine a “third wave” whose effect is to increase the 
level of democracy associated with any level of trade.  The relatively steep “predicted 
democracy” schedule shifts to the right (since we expect a higher level of democracy for 
any level of trade).  The system is now off the “predicted trade” schedule, so the level of 
trade rises until the system is back on that curve.  The higher level of trade implies a 
higher level of democracy, so the system now moves to the right until it is back on the 
“predicted democracy” schedule.  But each time a variable increases again, that increase 
is smaller than before.  Eventually the system converges on two stable, now higher, levels 
of democracy and trade.  One could play the same game by positing instead a decline in 
transport costs due to the advent of containerization that causes the relatively flat 
predicted-trade schedule to shift up.
64    
  Taken literally, this suggests that the bivariate relationship between globalization 
and democracy, while positive in both directions, has limits.  Whether this is good or bad 
                                                 
61 And other variables are, naturally, held constant at their respective means. 
62  Using the estimates for trade from the first column of Table 1 and the estimates for democracy from the 
first column of Table 5.  It turns out that the results are again the same when we consider our basic 
estimates for the impact of financial openness on democracy and of democracy on financial openness 
(results available from the authors on request). 
63 In the case of the democracy-as-a-function-of-globalization schedule, this is the short-run effect.  When 
we instead plot the long-run effect, the democracy-as-a-function-of-globalization schedule becomes steep 
(the effect of an increase in globalization is larger since the partial effect associated with the lagged 
dependent variable is between zero and one).  The shift in the values of both variables due to a shock to 
either of one becomes larger in the long run, but the stability analysis remains the same, since the 
democracy-as-a-function-of-globalization schedule was the steeper one before, and it is even steeper now. 
64 These results are for the entire 1870-2000 period.  We obtain similar patterns—albeit with different 
slopes—when we examine the interwar, Bretton Woods and post Bretton Woods periods separately.     30 
news, assuming that one prefers high values of both variables, depends on the nature of 
the shocks.   31 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: STUDIES OF THE EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY ON GLOBALIZATION 
Author(s)/Year  Countries  Period  Dependent Variable  Measure of Political 








Trade Openness (imports 
plus experts over GNP) 
Number of years 
country has been 
authoritarian 
· Proportional representation 
· Presidential system 
· Number of districts 











(internal and external 
market liberalization and 




political rights and 
civil liberties, the 
Freedom House) 











Measures of financial 
openness: 
· Change in capital account 
openness (Quinn, 1997) 
· Change in current account 
openness (Quinn, 1997) 
Polity index (change 
and level) 
· Vote share of 23 Communist 
parties  
· Number of revolutions, coups, 
guerrilla wars (Banks, 2001) 
· Level of dependent variable: 
Capital (or current) account 
openness of leading economies 
· Change and level of GDP 
· Change and level of investment 
· Population growth 
· Change and level of trade openness 
· Change and level of oil price 









Measures of trade policy: 
· Average statutory tariff 
rate 
· Economic liberalization 
indicator (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995, updated by 




· Polity index 
· Dictator index 
(Geddes, 1999) 
· Binary variable 
coding "democratic" 
regime (Alvarez et 
al., 1996, and 
Przeworski et al., 
2000) 
Internal factors: 
· Economic crisis dummy 
· Balance of payment crisis 
dummy 
· Number of years a government 
has been in the office 
External factors: 
· IMF agreement dummy   
· US exports and imports 
· GATT/WTO membership 
Internal factors: 
· Log of population 
· Real GDP per capita 
External factors: 
· Average tariff level for all LDCs 
· Average level of openness (Sachs 
and Warner, 1995) 
· Average age of the 
party system (Beck 
et al., 2001) 
· Level of secondary 
school completion 
among population 
over fifteen years 










indicator (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995, updated by 
Horn, Welch and Wacziarg, 
2003) 
Polity index 
· A dummy for socialist legal 
origin interacted with the main 
independent variable 
· Country fixed effects 







Log real bilateral exports 
from country i to country j  Polity index 
· WTO membership indicator 
· Regional trade agreement 
dummy (FTA, GSP, NAFTA, 
ASEAN, etc.) 
· Log GDP 
· Log GDP per capita 
· Emission level of carbon dioxide 
(proxy for environmental quality) 
· Geographical controls 
· Judicial 
independence 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GDP: The majority of data comes from Maddison (2001) and is augmented with series 
from Banks (various years) and Mitchell (various years).  To obtain a consistent series 
the data were converted to PPP.  The converted series from Maddison where then 
extrapolated backwards or forwards using the growth rate from Banks or Mitchell.  
Where an entire series was missing in Maddison we used the series from Banks or 
Mitchell. 
 
Trade Openness: Data on imports and exports come from Mitchell and Banks and were 
converted to PPP and then divided by GDP to obtain the ratio (imports+exports)/gdp 
 
Capital Controls: Data prior to 1970 are from Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and 
Martinez-Peria (2001).  From 1970-2000 the data comes from Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(2002). 
 
Population: The primary source for population is Banks (various years) augmented by 
data from the Penn World Table 6.1 and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Population Density: The primary source for population is Banks (various years) 
augmented by data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
Area: The primary source for population is Banks (various years) augmented by data 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
Urban Population: The primary source for population is Banks (various years) 
augmented by data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
Inflation: Data prior to 1970 are from Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-
Peria (2001).  From 1970-2000 the data comes from Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002). 
 
Government Balance: Data prior to 1970 are from Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and 
Martinez-Peria (2001).  From 1970-2000 the data comes from Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(2002). 
 
Democracy: We use the dichotomous measure developed by Przeworski et al. (1990) 
who calculate it from 1950-1990.  We use the coding from Boix and Rosato (2001) for 
the period 1800-1949 and from Cheibub and Ghandi (2005) for the period 1991-2000. 
 
Land/Labor and Capital/Labor Ratios: We used the data from O’Rourke and Taylor 
(2005) for the period prior to 1960 World Bank’s World Development Indicators for the 
period after 1960. 
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Table 1 
Effect of Democracy on Trade Openness 1870-2000: 
Dichotomous Measure of Democracy 











Democracy(t-1)  4.106***  1.616***  2.095***  3.929***  4.021*** 
  (0.633)  (0.283)  (0.239)  (0.459)  (0.601) 
Log(Total GDP PPP(t-1))  -0.919***  -0.758***  -0.791***  -0.963***  -0.853*** 
  (0.086)  (0.068)  (0.054)  (0.065)  (0.079) 
Log(Distance(t-1))  -0.783***  -0.025  1.244***  -1.364***  -1.022*** 
  (0.245)  (0.290)  (0.340)  (0.230)  (0.321) 
Log(Country Size(t-1))  0.002  -0.188***  -0.240***  0.064  0.013 
  (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.044)  (0.031) 
Log(Total Population(t-1))  0.486***  0.294***  0.706***  0.457***  0.452*** 
  (0.078)  (0.081)  (0.091)  (0.055)  (0.076) 
Interwar Period  -0.258         
  (0.223)         
Bretton Woods Period  0.893***         
  (0.202)         
Post Bretton Woods Period  2.781***         
  (0.267)         
Constant  5.527***  1.898  -12.251***  11.599***  9.988*** 
  (1.963)  (2.596)  (3.104)  (1.881)  (2.533) 
Observations  7362  763  712  2079  3792 
F  62.705  59.612  103.816  107.769  80.816 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  22.14  79.97  113.41  32.03  30.52 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  331.746  171.794  290.379  129.479  182.062 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hansen J Statistic  5.926  0.026  2.088  0.004  8.166 
  p-value  0.052  0.873  0.352  0.952  0.017 















Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model  (Tot  Dem=Number  of  Democracies  in  the  Systemt-2  Pop  Den=Population  Densityt-2  Urban 
Pop=Urban Populationt-2 Brit Col=Former British Colony).  The F-test refers to the F-test for the second 
stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust F-test for testing the 
exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that the 
first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the null that the first stage is over-identified.  .   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   40 
Table 2 
 Effect of Democracy on Trade Openness 1870-2000  
Political Regime Measured by Age of Democracy 











Log(Age of Democracy(t-1))  0.891***  0.335***  0.529***  1.068***  0.899*** 
  (0.095)  (0.055)  (0.067)  (0.115)  (0.113) 
Log(Total GDP PPP(t-1))  -0.855***  -0.645***  -0.778***  -1.039***  -0.808*** 
  (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.068)  (0.061) 
Log(Distance(t-1))  -0.753***  -0.123  1.028***  -0.839***  -1.499*** 
  (0.170)  (0.280)  (0.345)  (0.198)  (0.196) 
Log(Country Size(t-1))  -0.043*  -0.215***  -0.264***  0.061  -0.017 
  (0.026)  (0.051)  (0.046)  (0.037)  (0.026) 
Log(Total Population(t-1))  0.376***  0.203***  0.649***  0.537***  0.375*** 
  (0.047)  (0.069)  (0.090)  (0.055)  (0.052) 
Interwar Period  -0.225         
  (0.192)         
Bretton Woods Period  0.876***         
  (0.168)         
Post Bretton Woods Period  2.698***         
  (0.204)         
Constant  6.586***  3.137  -9.705***  7.333***  14.968*** 
  (1.443)  (2.468)  (3.121)  (1.681)  (1.673) 
Observations  6985  763  712  2079  3351 
F  81.692  65.462  110.367  112.940  98.572 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  82.45  189.47  50.21  38.90  88.78 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  806.351  423.095  326.647  172.323  301.549 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hansen J Statistic  0.210  0.025  8.171  0.304  8.967 
  p-value  0.647  0.875  0.017  0.581  0.003 















Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Const Age= Log(Age of the Constitution)t-2, Tot Dem=Number of Democracies in the Systemt-2 
Pop Den=Population Densityt-2 Urban Pop=Urban Populationt-2 Brit Col=Former British Colony).  The F-
test refers to the F-test for the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation robust F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald 
Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the 
null that the first stage is over-identified.   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   41 
Table 3 
 Effect of Democracy on Capital Controls 1870-2000: 
Dichotomous Measure of Democracy 








Democracy(t-1)  -0.768***  -0.782***  0.505***  -0.730*** 
  (0.204)  (0.300)  (0.166)  (0.148) 
Interwar Period  0.455***       
  (0.066)       
Bretton Woods Period  0.917***       
  (0.053)       
Post Bretton Woods Period  0.638***       
  (0.057)       
Log(Total GDP PPP(t-1))  0.004  -0.085***  0.004  0.013** 
  (0.007)  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-1))  0.053  0.544**  -0.353***  0.005 
  (0.054)  (0.241)  (0.082)  (0.035) 
Systemic Crises(t-1)  0.004*  0.069***  -0.018  0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.002) 
Inflation(t-1)  0.000***  0.003  -0.006***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Government Balance(t-1)  -0.006***  -0.009  0.001  -0.006*** 
  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant  -0.064  -2.949*  3.501***  0.868*** 
  (0.320)  (1.616)  (0.563)  (0.229) 
Observations  5440  316  650  3919 
F  78.858  14.891  6.276  49.884 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  19.35  8.38  18.21  35.57 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald  160.432  19.223  77.295  139.355 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hansen J Statistic  0.025  0.430  10.394  0.392 
  p-value  0.875  0.512  0.015  0.531 










Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Const Age= Log(Age of the Constitution)t-2, Tot Dem=Number of Democracies in the Systemt-2 
Pop Den=Population Densityt-2 Urban Pop=Urban Populationt-2 Brit Col=Former British Colony).  The F-
test refers to the F-test for the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation robust F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald 
Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the 
null that the first stage is over-identified.     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   42 
Table 4 
Effect of Democracy on Capital Controls 1870-2000: 
Political Regime Measured by Age of Democracy 








Log(Age of Democracy(t-1))  -0.092***  -0.116***  -0.004  -0.260*** 
  (0.030)  (0.035)  (0.072)  (0.062) 
Interwar Period  0.403***       
  (0.052)       
Bretton Woods Period  0.916***       
  (0.037)       
Post Bretton Woods Period  0.692***       
  (0.039)       
Log(Total GDP PPP(t-1))  0.007  -0.058***  -0.004  0.028*** 
  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.007) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-1))  -0.054*  0.327**  -0.129  0.067 
  (0.032)  (0.138)  (0.158)  (0.056) 
Systemic Crises(t-1)  0.004**  0.071***  -0.009  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.002) 
Inflation(t-1)  0.000***  0.002  -0.001  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Government Balance(t-1)  -0.003**  -0.002  0.002  -0.006*** 
  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant  0.500**  -1.680*  1.967*  0.260 
  (0.215)  (0.984)  (1.113)  (0.413) 
Observations  4935  316  701  3919 
F  224.128  34.859  5.690  50.756 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  53.71  59.32  26.27  21.83 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  391.748  150.483  42.985  91.291 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hansen J Statistic  1.060  0.131  8.121 
  p-value  0.303  0.717 
Exactly 
identified  0.004 




Tot Dem  Tot Dem 
Brit Col 
Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Const Age= Log(Age of the Constitution)t-2, Tot Dem=Number of Democracies in the Systemt-2 
Pop Den=Population Densityt-2 Urban Pop=Urban Populationt-2 Brit Col=Former British Colony).  The F-
test refers to the F-test for the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation robust F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald 
Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the 
null that the first stage is over-identified.     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   43 
Table 5 
 Effect of Trade on Democracy 1870-2000: 
 Dichotomous Measure of Democracy 











Log(Trade Openness(t-1))  0.174***  0.404***  0.208***  0.127**  0.189*** 
  (0.059)  (0.070)  (0.044)  (0.055)  (0.066) 
Prior Transitions To Dictatorship(t-1)  0.127***  0.191***  0.022  0.135***  0.114*** 
  (0.014)  (0.057)  (0.038)  (0.018)  (0.014) 
Log(Constitutional Age(t-1))  -0.039**  -0.211***  0.036**  -0.003  -0.051*** 
  (0.017)  (0.056)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.016) 
# of Democracies in System(t-1)  0.001  0.008  -0.002  -0.018***  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Interwar Period  0.059         
  (0.046)         
Bretton Woods Period  -0.056         
  (0.061)         
Post Bretton Woods Period  -0.325***         
  (0.104)         
Natural Resource Exporter  0.072  2.640***  0.948***  0.129*  -0.057 
  (0.060)  (0.502)  (0.224)  (0.069)  (0.047) 
Socialist Legal Origin  -0.466***    -0.532***  -0.610***  -0.298*** 
  (0.043)    (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.067) 
Latin America  -0.207***  -0.353**  -0.655***  -0.114**  -0.100 
  (0.044)  (0.142)  (0.087)  (0.052)  (0.074) 
Middle East  -0.656***      -0.483***  -0.571*** 
  (0.057)      (0.057)  (0.061) 
Africa  -0.517***      -0.362***  -0.448*** 
  (0.052)      (0.058)  (0.079) 
Asia  -0.135    0.727***  0.011  -0.149 
  (0.094)    (0.278)  (0.085)  (0.118) 
British Colonial Heritage  0.166***  0.831***  -0.170**  0.147***  0.109*** 
  (0.036)  (0.132)  (0.076)  (0.044)  (0.034) 
French Colonial Heritage  0.058      -0.024  0.074* 
  (0.039)      (0.051)  (0.039) 
Spanish Colonial Heritage  0.028  -0.240***  0.070  -0.029  0.092* 
  (0.040)  (0.090)  (0.067)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-1))  0.156***  0.228***  0.156***  0.135***  0.161*** 
  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.042) 
Growth Rate(t-1)  0.035  -0.228  0.019  -0.117  0.044 
  (0.104)  (0.486)  (0.165)  (0.179)  (0.134) 
Urban Population (t-1)  -0.081  0.901**  0.985***  0.106  -0.213** 
  (0.109)  (0.458)  (0.254)  (0.151)  (0.089) 
Population Density (t-1)  -0.000  -0.000  -0.002***  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  -0.025  0.250  0.178  0.518***  -0.354* 
  (0.059)  (0.263)  (0.179)  (0.123)  (0.196) 
Observations  6837  741  727  2010  3371 
F  79.606  38.408  297.287  110.162  120.391 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  17.63  23.07  27.73  13.04  23.07 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  63.927  19.440  10.576  23.739  32.829 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000   44 
Hansen J Statistic 











Instruments  Dist  Dist  Dist  Dist  Dist 
Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Dist=Log(Average Distance from the Rest of the World)t-2).  The F-test refers to the F-test for the 
second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust F-test for testing 
the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that 
the  first  stage  is  under-identified  and  the  Hansen  J  Statistic  tests  the  null  that  the  first  stage  is  over-
identified.    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   45 
Table 6 
Effect of Trade on Democracy 1870-2000: 
Political Regime Measured by Age of Democracy Measure 











  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
Log(Trade Openness(t-1))  0.692***  1.537***  0.378**  0.101  0.773*** 
  (0.206)  (0.295)  (0.149)  (0.093)  (0.221) 
Prior Transitions To Dictatorship(t-1)  0.211***  0.353  -0.155*  0.064  0.204*** 
  (0.045)  (0.218)  (0.084)  (0.050)  (0.047) 
Log(Constitutional Age(t-1))  0.071  -0.644***  0.416***  0.180***  0.065 
  (0.059)  (0.227)  (0.055)  (0.037)  (0.054) 
# of Democracies in System(t-1)  -0.003  0.032  -0.026*  -0.036***  -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.039)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
Interwar Period  0.612***         
  (0.169)         
Bretton Woods Period  0.282         
  (0.229)         
Post Bretton Woods Period  -0.693*         
  (0.377)         
Natural Resource Exporter  0.274  10.091***  1.726**  0.060  -0.225 
  (0.225)  (2.041)  (0.778)  (0.123)  (0.170) 
Socialist Legal Origin  -1.790***    -1.735***  -1.899***  -1.336*** 
  (0.137)    (0.113)  (0.129)  (0.213) 
Latin America  -1.123***  -1.356**  -2.274***  -1.186***  -0.691*** 
  (0.147)  (0.548)  (0.233)  (0.168)  (0.243) 
Middle East  -2.574***      -2.262***  -2.247*** 
  (0.199)      (0.162)  (0.212) 
Africa  -2.049***      -1.729***  -1.646*** 
  (0.188)      (0.166)  (0.266) 
Asia  -0.670**    0.799  -0.858***  -0.588 
  (0.340)    (0.898)  (0.193)  (0.404) 
British Colonial Heritage  0.514***  3.749***  -0.023  0.508***  0.307** 
  (0.138)  (0.529)  (0.216)  (0.131)  (0.127) 
French Colonial Heritage  0.334**      0.108  0.388*** 
  (0.144)      (0.113)  (0.143) 
Spanish Colonial Heritage  0.148  -1.154***  0.515***  -0.055  0.481*** 
  (0.133)  (0.320)  (0.179)  (0.144)  (0.154) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-1))  0.609***  0.647***  0.305***  0.257***  0.685*** 
  (0.123)  (0.107)  (0.098)  (0.065)  (0.138) 
Growth Rate(t-1)  -0.060  -0.731  0.072  -1.044**  -0.034 
  (0.346)  (1.881)  (0.429)  (0.472)  (0.430) 
Urban Population (t-1)  -0.313  3.055*  3.036***  1.060***  -0.794** 
  (0.398)  (1.713)  (0.725)  (0.396)  (0.336) 
Population Density (t-1)  -0.000  -0.002  -0.004***  0.002***  0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Constant  -0.828***  1.402  0.838**  1.516***  -2.059*** 
  (0.210)  (1.041)  (0.426)  (0.405)  (0.645) 
Observations  6837  741  727  2010  3371 
F  90.953  22.317  188.483  136.517  122.069 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  17.63  23.07  27.73  26.07  23.97 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  63.927  19.440  10.576  72.571  32.829   46 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
Hansen J Statistic  1.765 






identified  0.184 
Exactly 
identified 
Instruments  Dist  Dist  Dist  Dist 
Area 
Dist 
Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Dist=Log(Average Distance from the Rest of the World)t-2, Area=Log(Country Area (sq miles)t-2).  
The F-test refers to the F-test for the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and 
auto-correlation robust F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald 
Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the 
null that the first stage is over-identified.     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   47 
Table 7 
 Effect of Capital Controls on Democracy 1870-2000: 
 Dichotomous Measure of Democracy 






 Post Bretton 
Woods 
  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
Capital Controls(t-1)  0.134  -0.345**  0.872  -0.292* 
  (0.164)  (0.153)  (0.800)  (0.154) 
Prior Transitions To Dictatorship(t-1)  0.080***  0.088*  0.035  0.101*** 
  (0.014)  (0.049)  (0.067)  (0.011) 
Log(Constitutional Age(t-1))  -0.004  0.100***  0.071  -0.011 
  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.096)  (0.009) 
# of Democracies in System(t-1)  0.004***  -0.017  -0.014  0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.000) 
Interwar Period  0.010       
  (0.089)       
Bretton Woods Period  -0.092       
  (0.164)       
Post Bretton Woods Period  -0.212       
  (0.158)       
Natural Resource Exporter  -0.018      -0.022 
  (0.041)      (0.031) 
Socialist Legal Origin  -0.427***      -0.381*** 
  (0.065)      (0.049) 
Latin America  -0.219***  -0.544***  0.531  -0.227*** 
  (0.047)  (0.112)  (0.488)  (0.044) 
Middle East  -0.705***    -0.894*  -0.697*** 
  (0.064)    (0.479)  (0.048) 
Africa  -0.618***      -0.587*** 
  (0.060)      (0.044) 
Asia  -0.389***      -0.420*** 
  (0.050)      (0.040) 
British Colonial Heritage  0.187***  -0.213**  0.439  0.166*** 
  (0.032)  (0.099)  (0.505)  (0.027) 
French Colonial Heritage  0.025      0.053* 
  (0.038)      (0.028) 
Spanish Colonial Heritage  0.074*  0.317***  -0.229*  0.011 
  (0.044)  (0.081)  (0.121)  (0.047) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-1))  0.057***  0.045**  0.083**  0.023*** 
  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.008) 
Growth Rate(t-1)  0.007  0.382  -0.668  0.081 
  (0.117)  (0.302)  (0.692)  (0.103) 
Urban Population (t-1)  -0.043  0.769*  -0.895  -0.167** 
  (0.087)  (0.402)  (0.684)  (0.071) 
Population Density (t-1)  0.000***  -0.002***  0.002**  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Constant  0.119  0.621  -0.274  0.536*** 
  (0.076)  (0.518)  (0.961)  (0.194) 
Observations  4783  382  597  3472 
F  128.107  16.898  68.469  192.239 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  16.08  198.77  1.18  14.13 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.3182  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  74.809  142.674  8.081  71.832 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.152  0.000   48 
Hansen J Statistic  2.250  5.481  3.073 
  p-value  0.325 
Exactly 
identified  0.241  0.215 
Instruments  Tot Cr 
Inf 
Gov Bal 







Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Tot Cr=Total Number of Global Crisest-2, Inf=Inflationt-2, Gov Bal=Government Surplus/Deficitt-2, 
Ec Size=log(GDPt-2), Tot Cap=Total Number of Countries with Capital Controlst-2).  The F-test refers to 
the F-test for the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust 
F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald Under-ID tests the null 
hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the null that the first stage 
is over-identified.     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   49 
Table 8 
 Effect of Capital Controls on Democracy 1870-2000: 
 Political Regime Measured by Age of Democracy 








  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
Capital Controls(t-1)  -1.406**  -1.406**  5.969  -1.113* 
  (0.683)  (0.683)  (4.310)  (0.656) 
Prior Transitions To Dictatorship(t-1)  0.136***  0.136***  -0.140  0.135*** 
  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.203)  (0.031) 
Log(Constitutional Age(t-1))  0.220***  0.220***  0.958**  0.231*** 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.467)  (0.027) 
# of Democracies in System(t-1)  0.005**  0.005**  -0.051  0.007*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.046)  (0.002) 
Interwar Period  1.074***  1.074***     
  (0.303)  (0.303)     
Bretton Woods Period  2.067***  2.067***     
  (0.635)  (0.635)     
Post Bretton Woods Period  1.647**  1.647**     
  (0.641)  (0.641)     
Natural Resource Exporter  -0.155  -0.155  2.735  -0.077 
  (0.145)  (0.145)  (1.712)  (0.096) 
Socialist Legal Origin  -1.531***  -1.531***  -2.681***  -1.738*** 
  (0.202)  (0.202)  (1.006)  (0.174) 
Latin America  -1.072***  -1.072***  1.814  -1.194*** 
  (0.144)  (0.144)  (1.949)  (0.135) 
Middle East  -2.678***  -2.678***  -2.376*  -2.672*** 
  (0.230)  (0.230)  (1.369)  (0.161) 
Africa  -2.053***  -2.053***  -3.197**  -2.223*** 
  (0.185)  (0.185)  (1.578)  (0.145) 
Asia  -1.691***  -1.691***  -1.205*  -1.795*** 
  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.729)  (0.126) 
British Colonial Heritage  0.659***  0.659***  0.979  0.430*** 
  (0.123)  (0.123)  (1.093)  (0.088) 
French Colonial Heritage  0.262**  0.262**  2.020  0.159* 
  (0.124)  (0.124)  (2.220)  (0.094) 
Spanish Colonial Heritage  0.062  0.062  -0.040  0.073 
  (0.156)  (0.156)  (0.622)  (0.143) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-1))  0.163***  0.163***  0.125  0.125*** 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.173)  (0.032) 
Growth Rate(t-1)  0.346  0.346  -0.626  0.291 
  (0.280)  (0.280)  (2.161)  (0.262) 
Urban Population (t-1)  -0.532*  -0.532*  -0.334  -0.631** 
  (0.302)  (0.302)  (1.593)  (0.247) 
Population Density (t-1)  0.002***  0.002***  0.005**  0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Constant  -0.250  -0.250  -4.367  1.514* 
  (0.272)  (0.272)  (4.705)  (0.825) 
Observations  5341  5341  839  3472 
F  120.951  120.951  18.445  288.049 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  8.38  221.47  1.48  11.09 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.219  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  53.847  53.847  10.260  26.390 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.016  0.000   50 
Hansen J Statistic  2.926  2.926  1.678  0.396 
  p-value  0.232  0.232  0.432  0.529 
Instruments  Tot Cr 
Tot Cap 
Ec Size 







Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Tot Cr=Total Number of Global Crisest-2, Inf=Inflationt-2, Gov Bal=Government Surplus/Deficitt-2, 
Ec Size=log(GDPt-2), Tot Cap=Total Number of Countries with Capital Controlst-2).  The F-test refers to 
the F-test for the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust 
F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald Under-ID tests the null 
hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the null that the first stage 
is over-identified.   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   51 
Table 9 
 Effect of Trade and Capital Controls on Democracy 1870-2000: 
  





Log(Trade Openness(t-1))  0.097  0.074*** 
  (0.064)  (0.019) 
Capital Controls(t-1)  -1.200*  -0.123 
  (0.632)  (0.201) 
Prior Transitions To Dictatorship(t-1)  0.139***  0.109*** 
  (0.044)  (0.014) 
Log(Constitutional Age(t-1))  0.207***  -0.024* 
  (0.040)  (0.012) 
# of Democracies in System(t-1)  0.004  0.002** 
  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Interwar Period  1.044***  0.122 
  (0.294)  (0.089) 
Bretton Woods Period  1.846***  0.145 
  (0.590)  (0.184) 
Post Bretton Woods Period  1.298**  -0.073 
  (0.612)  (0.190) 
Natural Resource Exporter  -0.112  -0.017 
  (0.149)  (0.051) 
Socialist Legal Origin  -1.659***  -0.393*** 
  (0.185)  (0.065) 
Latin America  -1.063***  -0.182*** 
  (0.139)  (0.042) 
Middle East  -2.631***  -0.692*** 
  (0.225)  (0.065) 
Africa  -2.031***  -0.523*** 
  (0.188)  (0.059) 
Asia  -1.595***  -0.334*** 
  (0.181)  (0.057) 
British Colonial Heritage  0.649***  0.211*** 
  (0.120)  (0.032) 
French Colonial Heritage  0.267**  0.086** 
  (0.121)  (0.037) 
Spanish Colonial Heritage  0.102  0.057 
  (0.149)  (0.047) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-1))  0.237***  0.098*** 
  (0.051)  (0.015) 
Growth Rate(t-1)  0.168  0.063 
  (0.301)  (0.110) 
Urban Population (t-1)  -0.548*  -0.136 
  (0.301)  (0.093) 
Population Density (t-1)  0.002***  0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  -0.414*  0.040 
  (0.249)  (0.076) 
Observations  5127  5127 
F  136.481  115.754 
  p-value  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F: Trade  131.12  131.12 
  p-value  0.000  0.000   52 
First Stage F: Capital Controls  12.79  12.79 
  p-value  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  45.514  45.514 
p-value  0.000  0.000 











2-test for joint significance of trade and capital control terms in column 1:    7.00 (p<0.0302) 
c
2-test for joint significance of trade and capital control terms in column 2:  16.56 (p<0.0000) 
Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Tot Cr=Total Number of Global Crisest-2, Ec Size=log(GDPt-2)).  The F-test refers to the F-test for 
the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust F-test for 
testing  the  exclusion  of  the  instruments  from  the  first  stage;  Cragg-Donald  Under-ID  tests  the  null 
hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the null that the first stage 
is over-identified.     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   53 
Table 10 
Effect of Democracy on Trade Openness 1950-2000: 
Alternative (Sachs-Warner) Measure of Openness 
  Dichotomous 
Measure of 
Democracy 
Age of Democracy 
Democracy(t-1)  0.094***  0.023* 
  (0.036)  (0.013) 
Years Closed  0.002***  0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Log(Distance(t-1))  -0.036  -0.021 
  (0.024)  (0.023) 
Log(Country Size(t-1))  -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Log(Total Population(t-1))  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log(Total GDP PPP(t-1))  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Post Bretton Woods Period  -0.023***  -0.028*** 
  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Constant  -4.056***  -4.219*** 
  (0.842)  (0.829) 
Observations  3096  3096 
F  5.780  5.444 
  p-value  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F  18.70  18.04 
  p-value  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  190.297  212.152 
  p-value  0.000  0.000 
Hansen J Statistic  0.183  4.104 
  p-value  0.912  0.128 






Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model (Const Age= Log(Age of the Constitution)t-2, Pop Den=Population Densityt-2 ,Urban Pop=Urban 
Populationt-2  The  F-test  refers  to  the  F-test  for  the  second  stage  model.  The  First  Stage  F  is  the 
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the 
first stage; Cragg-Donald Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the 
Hansen J Statistic tests the null that the first stage is over-identified.     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   54 
Table 11  
Effect of Trade and Capital Account Policies on Democracy, 1870-2000:  
Markov Models  
  Trade  Capital Controls  Trade & Cap Cont 
  a  a+b  a  a+b  a  a+b 
Log(Trade Openness(t-1))  -0.022**  0.029***      -0.041  0.050** 
  (0.009)  (0.007)      (0.027)  (0.023) 
Capital Controls(t-1)      0.014  -0.122*  0.064  -0.10 
      (0.039)  (0.07)  (0.049)  (0.079) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-
1)) 
0.000  0.018***  -0.003  0.004**  -0.004  0.033*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Growth Rate(t-1)  -0.089**  0.318***  -0.128**  0.322***  -0.153***  0.343*** 
  (0.035)  (0.083)  (0.053)  (0.098)  (0.057)  (0.118) 
Urban Population (t-1)  0.118***  0.057**  0.042  -0.031  0.114**  0.079 
  (0.041)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.053)  (0.058) 
Population Density (t-1)  0.000**  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Prior Transitions To 
Dictatorship(t-1) 
-0.002    -0.004    -0.003   
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004)   




  -0.020***   
  (0.002)    (0.004)    (0.005)   
# of Democracies in System(t-
1) 
0.000    0.000    -0.000   
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Interwar Period  -
0.023*** 
  -0.026    -0.058***   
  (0.008)    (0.016)    (0.019)   
Bretton Woods Period  -0.019**    0.046    -0.024   
  (0.008)    (0.045)    (0.049)   
Post Bretton Woods Period  -0.022**    0.038    -0.061   
  (0.010)    (0.042)    (0.048)   
Natural Resource Exporter  -0.015*    -0.013    0.018   
  (0.008)    (0.009)    (0.018)   
Socialist Legal Origin  -0.007    -0.019    0.007   
  (0.011)    (0.014)    (0.026)   
Latin America  0.004    -0.012    0.036   
  (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.023)   




  -0.028   
  (0.009)    (0.016)    (0.018)   
Africa  -0.006    -
0.051*** 
  0.021   
  (0.019)    (0.014)    (0.047)   
Asia  -0.020*    -0.015    0.055   
  (0.012)    (0.017)    (0.038)   
British Colonial Heritage  0.028***    -0.004    0.022   
  (0.008)    (0.011)    (0.019)   
French Colonial Heritage  -0.011    -0.017    -0.034**   
  (0.007)    (0.012)    (0.015)   
Spanish Colonial Heritage  0.003    -0.009    -0.014   
  (0.008)    (0.012)    (0.014)   
Constant  0.012  0.889***  0.057***  1.05***  0.039*  0.930***   55 
  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.043)  (0.021)  (0.062) 
Observations  6837    4804    4468   
F  7632.449    5218.815    2812.100   
  p-value  0.000    0.000    0.000   
First Stage F: Trade  627.76        204.44   
  p-value  0.000        0.000   
First Stage F: 
Trade*Democracy 
289.19        114.10   
  p-value  0.000        0.000   
First Stage F: Capital Controls      15.72    15.43   
  p-value      0.000    0.000   
First Stage F: Capital 
Con*Demo 
    13.68    12.25   
  p-value      0.000    0.000   
Cragg-Donald Under-ID Test  88.790    19.071    10.081   
  p-value  0.000    0.000    0.006   
Hansen J Statistic  0.306    0.002    0.258   
  p-value  0.858    0.966    0.611   




  Inf 
Gov Bal 
Ec Size 






Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
model  (Dist=log(Average  Distance)t-2,  Inf=Inflationt-2,  Gov  Bal=Government  Surplus/Deficitt-2,  Ec 
Size=log(GDPt-2), Pop=Log(Population)t-2) Area=Log(Country Size)t-2.  The F-test refers to the F-test for 
the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust F-test for 
testing  the  exclusion  of  the  instruments  from  the  first  stage;  Cragg-Donald  Under-ID  tests  the  null 
hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the null that the first stage 
is over-identified.  .   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   56 
Table 12  
Democracy, Land-Labor Ratios and Trade Openness 







Democracy(t-1)  1.146*  1.281***  1.403  1.822*** 
  (0.670)  (0.485)  (7.563)  (0.516) 
Democracy*Land-Labor Ratio(t-1)  -1.054**  -0.222  -0.051  -0.519 
  (0.515)  (0.252)  (5.119)  (0.401) 
Log(Distance(t-1))  -0.605**  -0.071  0.714  -1.324*** 
  (0.252)  (0.365)  (4.001)  (0.222) 
Log(Country Size(t-1))  -0.035  0.079*  -0.084  -0.053** 
  (0.027)  (0.045)  (0.656)  (0.025) 
Log(Total Population(t-1))  0.227***  0.174***  0.327  0.314*** 
  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.207)  (0.049) 
Log(Total GDP PPP(t-1))  -0.556***  -0.740***  -0.682***  -0.639*** 
  (0.085)  (0.056)  (0.075)  (0.054) 
Interwar Period  0.141       
  (0.280)       
Bretton Woods Period  0.449       
  (0.313)       
Post Bretton Woods Period  1.513***      1.223*** 
  (0.455)      (0.123) 
Constant  5.439***  1.728  -5.767  11.757*** 
  (1.925)  (3.185)  (37.681)  (1.826) 
Observations  5676  621  506  4502 
F  68.114  74.516  42.580  92.958 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Joint c
2 test: Democracy, LLR & 
Interaction 
41.40  18.76  17.62  58.52 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F: Democracy  85.28  96.27  47.20  117.79 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F: Democracy*LLR  86.30  398.68  40.74  115.03 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Underid Test  122.966  257.183  1.184  243.674 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.277  0.000 


















Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard  errors  in  parentheses.  Both  Democracyt-1  and  Democracy*Land-Labor  Ratiot-1  are  considered 
endogenous variables. Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage model 
(Pop Den=Population Densityt-2, Brit Col=Former British Colony).  The F-test refers to the F-test for the 
second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust F-test for testing 
the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that 
the  first  stage  is  under-identified  and  the  Hansen  J  Statistic  tests  the  null  that  the  first  stage  is  over-
identified.     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   57 
Table 13 
 Democracy, Capital-Labor Ratios, Land-Labor Ratios 
 and Trade Openness 







Democracy(t-1)  8.522***  7.416***  2.487***  2.791 
  (3.140)  (2.075)  (0.956)  (5.997) 
Democracy*Land-Labor Ratio(t-1)  -1.086  -7.883***  -1.078  7.826 
  (1.206)  (2.638)  (0.668)  (10.714) 
Democracy*Capital-Labor Ratio(t-10)  1.938*  22.840**  0.782  3.600*** 
  (1.051)  (9.088)  (1.052)  (0.886) 
Log(Distance(t-1))  -1.368*  4.313***  1.711***  -0.589 
  (0.757)  (1.623)  (0.641)  (1.069) 
Log(Country Size(t-1))  0.120  -0.185  -0.033  -0.247 
  (0.133)  (0.163)  (0.152)  (0.218) 
Log(Total Population(t-1))  0.983***  -0.396  0.314***  0.749*** 
  (0.242)  (0.327)  (0.108)  (0.201) 
Log(Total GDP PPP(t-1))  -1.797***  -0.777***  -0.743***  -1.184*** 
  (0.357)  (0.146)  (0.064)  (0.355) 
Interwar Period  -0.050       
  (0.480)       
Bretton Woods Period  1.253*      -2.040 
  (0.656)      (1.283) 
Post Bretton Woods Period  3.762***       
  (1.016)       
Constant  9.779*  -27.607**  -13.968**  9.043 
  (5.787)  (11.481)  (5.738)  (11.184) 
Observations  5106  543  467  3941 
F  9.150  8.516  50.177  9.425 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F: Democracy  5.02  64.42  109.80  86.19 
p-value  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F: Democracy*KL Ratio  32.17  24.37  41.41  54.26 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F: Democracy*LL ratio  23.57  249.90  138.93  45.31 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Joint c
2 test: Democracy, Ratios & 
Interactions 
19.62  13.55  29.12  28.12 
 p-value  0.0002  0.004  0.000  0.000 
Joint c
2 test: Democracy, KL Ratio & 
Interaction 
19.24  13.08  9.70  3.12 
 p-value  0.000  0.001  0.008  0.210 
Joint c
2 test: Democracy, LL Ratio & 
Interaction 
7.40  13.45  7.83  28.81 
 p-value  0.025  0.001  0.020  0.000 
Cragg-Donald Underid Test  46.228  17.232  49.638  1.696 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.193 






















Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard  errors  in  parentheses.  Democracyt-1,  Democracy*Capital-Labor  Ratiot-1  and  Democracy*Land-
Labor Ratiot-1 are considered endogenous variables. Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments   58 
used  in  the  first  stage  model  (Const  Age=log(Constitutional  Age)t-2,  Sum  Trans=Total  Number  of 
Transitions to Autocracy for Country it-2,  Urban=Urbanization-t-2, Brit Col=Former British Colony).  The 
F-test refers to the F-test for the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation robust F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald 
Under-ID tests the null hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the 
null that the first stage is over-identified.   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 14  
Democracy, Capital-Labor Ratios, Land-Labor Ratios and  
Capital Controls 





Democracy(t-1)  -0.811***  -7.753  -0.542** 
  (0.299)  (127.240)  (0.227) 
Democracy*Land-Labor Ratio(t-1)  0.187  -0.535  0.135 
  (0.153)  (11.516)  (0.234) 
Democracy*Capital-Labor Ratio(t-1)  -0.649***  4.522  -0.525*** 
  (0.200)  (82.739)  (0.157) 
Interwar Period  0.328***     
  (0.076)     
Bretton Woods Period  0.686***     
  (0.146)     
Post Bretton Woods Period  0.395**    -0.147* 
  (0.201)    (0.076) 
Log(Total GDP PPP(t-1))  0.011  -0.490  0.014 
  (0.014)  (7.341)  (0.011) 
Log(GDP Per Capita PPP(t-1))  0.375***  4.345  0.242** 
  (0.137)  (70.991)  (0.103) 
Systemic Crises(t-1)  0.005  0.146  0.005** 
  (0.003)  (2.000)  (0.002) 
Systemic Capital Controls(t-1)  0.004*  -0.087  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (2.220)  (0.002) 
Inflation(t-1)  0.000***  0.054  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.879)  (0.000) 
Government Balance(t-1)  -0.010**  -0.083  -0.009** 
  (0.004)  (1.355)  (0.004) 
Constant  -2.617***  -26.203  -0.702 
  (0.990)  (434.670)  (0.837) 
Observations  4045  241  3317 
F  54.220  0.364  24.276 
p-value  0.000  0.951  0.000 
First Stage F: Democracy  11.39  4.15  14.45 
p-value  0.000  0.007  0.000 
First Stage F: Democracy*KL Ratio  23.75  50.61  28.16 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000 
First Stage F: Democracy*LL Ratio  20.95  255.25  10.62 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Joint c
2 test: Democracy, Ratios & Interactions  15.03  0.05  15.11 
 p-value  0.00  0.9972  0.002 
Joint c
2 test: Democracy, KL Ratio & Interaction  15.03  0.04  13.75 
 p-value  0.001  0.979  0.018 
Joint c
2 test: Democracy, LL Ratio & Interaction  7.46  0.02  8.18 
 p-value  0.024  0.987  0.017 
Cragg-Donald Underid Test  64.029  0.006  42.833 
p-value  0.000  0.940  0.000 

















Instrumental  variables  regression  estimated  via  GMM;  heteroscedastic  and  auto-correlation  consistent 
standard  errors  in  parentheses.  Democracyt-1,  Democracy*Capital-Labor  Ratiot-1  and  Democracy*Land-  60 
Labor Ratiot-1 are considered endogenous variables. Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments 
used  in  the  first  stage  model  (Const  Tot  Dem=Total  Number  of  Democracies  in  the  Systemt-2,  Pop 
Den=Population Densityt-2, Urban=Urbanization-2, Brit Col=Former British Colony).  The F-test refers to 
the F-test for the second stage model. The First Stage F is the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust 
F-test for testing the exclusion of the instruments from the first stage; Cragg-Donald Under-ID tests the null 
hypothesis that the first stage is under-identified and the Hansen J Statistic tests the null that the first stage 
is over-identified.   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of Globalization and Democracy 
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Figure 2 
Estimated Relationships Between Trade and Democracy 
(Democracy is on the horizontal axis, trade on the vertical) 
 
 
Note: to generate these relationships we took the estimate impact of democracy on trade 
(Table 1) and obtained the predicted values holding all other variables at their means.  
We then took the exponent and standardized these values so that they run between 0 and 
1.  Similarly, we took the estimated the impact of trade on democracy (Table 5) and 
obtained the predicted probability of democracy. (We standardized the actual values of 
trade openness so that it ranges between 0 and 1.) 
 